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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, the jury convicted Russell Dale Hilterbran of one count of
felony attempted strangulation and one count of felony domestic violence. On appeal,
Mr. Hilterbran asserts the district court abused its discretion when it admitted hearsay
statements made by the alleged victim to a forensic nurse under Idaho Rule of Evidence
803(4), because the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements indicated
they were not made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Hilterbran by Information with two counts of attempted
strangulation, felony, I.C. § 18-923, one count of domestic violence, felony, I.C. §§ 18903(a) and 18-918(2), two counts of aggravated assault, felony, I.C. §§ 18-901(b) and
18-905(a), two counts of domestic battery, misdemeanor, I.C. §§ 18-903(a) and 18918(3), and one count of violation of a no contact order, misdemeanor, I.C. § 18-920.
(R., pp.48-51.) Mr. Hilterbran entered not guilty pleas to the charges. (See R., p.57.)
The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the State told the district court it only
intended to proceed on the two attempted strangulation counts and the domestic
violence count, and would move to dismiss the other counts. (See Tr., p.1, Ls.17-23.)
During the trial, Cathy Scholtz testified that she and Mr. Hilterbran had been living
together in Boise. (See Tr., p.154, L.10 – p.155, L.19.) She testified that one day, she
had been arguing with Mr. Hilterbran when he put one or both of his hands on her throat
and applied pressure until she lost consciousness. (Tr., p.168, L.2 – p.169, L.9.)
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Ms. Scholtz also testified that in the weeks after that first incident, she had an
argument with Mr. Hilterbran over her adult daughter, Tracy Scholtz, living with them.
(See Tr., p.158, L.25 – p.160, L.20.) Mr. Hilterbran did not want Tracy living there.
(Tr., p.159, L.20 – p.160, L.5.) Ms. Scholtz testified Mr. Hilterbran grabbed her face,
leaving a bruise on her jaw. (Tr., p.160, L.21 – p.163, L.6.) She testified he then put his
hand on her throat and applied pressure until she went unconscious. (Tr., p.163, L.7 –
p.164, L.2.) Ms. Scholtz testified her neck and throat hurt after this second incident, and
it hurt to swallow. (Tr., p.164, L.22 – p.165, L.1.)
Ms. Scholtz testified she was on blood thinners and bruised easily, she had
stents in her heart, and she had suffered a brain aneurysm prior to the second incident.
(See Tr., p.165, L.25 – p.166, L.15.) She would bump into things frequently and fall,
and she received some bruises from that. (Tr., p.166, Ls.19-25.) Mr. Hilterbran was
aware of her health issues. (Tr., p.167, Ls.6-22.) On cross examination, Ms. Scholtz
testified her health issues affected her memory and she sometimes had trouble recalling
things. (Tr., p.175, Ls.7-12.)
Mr. Hilterbran testified he and Ms. Scholtz had lived together in Oklahoma for
four years before they moved to Boise to be near her children from a previous marriage.
(Tr., p.291, L.12 – p.292, L.2.) He testified that Tracy did not pay rent, which made him
feel like Tracy was using or manipulating Ms. Scholtz. (Tr., p.293, L.18 – p.294, L.2.)
At one point, Tracy moved out temporarily after throwing hamburger and hot grease
from the stove on Mr. Hilterbran. (Tr., p.294, Ls.14-25.) Mr. Hilterbran testified Tracy
let people use drugs in the house and would not take her medication for her mental
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problems. (Tr., p.295, Ls.3-8.) He and Ms. Scholtz would argue about Tracy continuing
to manipulate her. (See Tr., p.295, L.13 – p.296, L.3.)
Mr. Hilterbran testified that, on the day the second incident was supposed to
have happened, he found Tracy and her friends using methamphetamine on the back
porch. (See Tr., p.296, Ls.4-10.) He told Tracy and Ms. Scholtz that Tracy would have
to go. (Tr., p.296, Ls.15-19.) Ms. Scholtz took Tracy to a motel room. (See Tr., p.296,
Ls.20-24.) The next morning, Mr. Hilterbran and Ms. Scholtz were drinking coffee when
the police arrived and told him they were there for an abuse report. (Tr., p.297, L.9 –
p.298, L.4.) The officers handcuffed him, placed him a police car, and took him to an
interrogation room. (Tr., p.298, Ls.5-20.)
Regarding the bruise on Ms. Scholtz’s jaw, Mr. Hilterbran testified, “there’s no
way that I could have ever done that because that would have been the right thumb. I
amputated this finger and two fingers as well.” (Tr., p.299, Ls.16-23.) He was missing a
pinky and two other fingers on his left hand, leaving him with a weakened grip.
(Tr., p.299, L.24 – p.300, L.5; see Tr., p.307, Ls.8-12.) Mr. Hilterbran denied choking,
attempting to strangle, or battering Ms. Scholtz on the days of the first incident and
second incident. (See Tr., p.300, L.18 – p.301, L.4.)
On direct examination, Ms. Scholtz testified Tracy called one of Ms. Scholtz’s
other daughters, Jennifer McCormick, about the second incident, and Ms. McCormick
called the police. (See Tr., p.170, L.25 – p.171, L.19.) The day after the second
incident, police officers came to their house. (Tr., p.171, Ls.20-22.) Ms. Scholtz spoke
with officers at the house and at the police station. (Tr., p.171, L.23 – p.172, L.15.)
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Two days later, Ms. Scholtz went to the Family Advocacy Center and Education
Services (FACES) Family Justice Center for a physical examination and spoke with a
nurse about what had happened. (See Tr., p.172, L.16 – p.173, L.2, p.247, L.25 –
p.248, L.3.)

Ms. McCormick testified on cross examination that Ms. Scholtz “had

already been in the ER” before she went to FACES. (Tr., p.189, Ls.19-23.) Ms. Scholtz
testified it hurt to swallow “[j]ust a day or two. That’s when the police made me go to the
hospital.” (Tr., p.165, Ls.2-4.)
Mr. Hilterbran objected to the introduction of testimony from the FACES forensic
nurse, Cynthia Cook, on the grounds of inadequate expert disclosure under Idaho
Criminal Rule 16, cumulative evidence, and that the alleged victim’s statements to
Ms. Cook constituted hearsay. (Tr., p.204, L.10 – p.205, L.23.) Mr. Hilterbran asserted,
to the extent the State would rely on the hearsay exception for statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment,1 “FACES is not for the purpose of a
medical diagnosis and treating but that it is in preparation for testimony through police
and prosecution.” (Tr., p.205, Ls.18-23.) The State argued that the statements were
“for the purpose of medical treatment and diagnosis.” (Tr., p.209, L.15.) The State also
filed a State’s Written Response to Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of Cyndee
Cook. (R., pp.90-98.)
The district court determined Ms. Scholtz’s statements made to the forensic
nurse were hearsay. (See Tr., p.218, Ls.1-4.) The district court framed the hearsay

1

Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides that “[s]tatements made for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment,” are not excluded by the hearsay rule.
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exception issue as “whether the statements are part of a forensic interview intended to
provide evidence for the prosecution of the matter or whether the statements were
intended to provide a basis for a medical diagnosis.” (Tr., p.218, Ls.11-15.) Based on
its review of case law, the district court thought it was supposed to “make a
determination based on the totality of the circumstances to whether the interview was
geared toward gathering evidence rather than providing medical treatment.” (Tr., p.219,
L.22 – p.220, L.2.) The district court determined “there are both of those things at play
with this nurse. . . . [C]ertainly there’s evidence that there’s at least a dual purpose to
the interview by the nurse.” (Tr., p.220, Ls.3-9.) The district court would allow the State
to lay the foundation if it could, and would allow Mr. Hilterbran to voir dire the nurse by
asking questions in aid of the objection. (Tr., p.220, Ls.10-14.) The district court would
then determine, under the totality of the circumstances, whether or not the Rule 803(4)
exception applied.

(Tr., p.220, Ls.14-22.)

The district court also overruled the

cumulative evidence objection (Tr., p.222, Ls.14-21), and restricted Ms. Cook’s opinion
testimony based on the State’s expert disclosure. (Tr., p.225, Ls.14-21.)
Ms. Cook testified she was a registered nurse who was employed by
St. Alphonsus as the coordinator for the forensic nurse examiner team. (Tr., p.232, L.10
– p.233, L.2.) Her job was physically located at FACES. (Tr., p.233, Ls.3-12.) She
testified she had training as a forensic nurse with domestic violence. (Tr., p.234, L.12 –
p.236, L.6.) Ms. Cook explained that a forensic nurse’s duties during a forensic exam
were twofold: to “clear and triage the medical patients, the medical needs of the patient
and get them the referrals and resources they need,” and “the forensic aspect where we
can collect evidence, we can photograph injuries and document them.” (Tr., p.235, L.18
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– p.236, L.4.) She also had training with respect to strangulation injuries. (Tr., p.237,
L.2 – p.241, L.3.) Ms. Cook testified the primary purpose of a FACES forensic exam
was medical in nature. (Tr., p.241, L.4 – p.242, L.14.)
During voir dire examination by Mr. Hilterbran’s counsel, Ms. Cook testified that
one component of FACES was a victims’ advocacy center. (Tr., p.248, Ls.9-17.) The
partners of FACES included various police departments and prosecutor’s offices,
among them the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office and the Boise Police
Department.

(Tr., p.248, L.23 – p.249, L.24.)

FACES provided domestic violence

services involving communication with law enforcement agencies and prosecutor’s
offices, safety planning for alleged victims, and coordination between prosecutors and
law enforcement through a victim advocate. (Tr., p.251, L.10 – p.252, L.8.)
Ms. Cook further testified during voir dire examination that Ms. Scholtz had been
referred by a Boise Police Department victim witness coordinator. (Tr., p.254, Ls.1216.) Ms. Scholtz’s visit was not billed to her because it was paid for through a grant
from the United States Department of Justice. (See Tr., p.254, L.24 – p.255, L.7.) The
patient type was listed as “single visit,” and Ms. Cook referred Ms. Scholtz to the
physician at FACES, who she saw the same day as her forensic evaluation. (Tr., p.255,
L.9 – p.256, L.9.) She testified her report noted that it was a domestic violence forensic
report, and the evidence she collected could be given to police and prosecutors.
(Tr., p.257, Ls.9-17; see Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.69-81.)
In answering the State’s voir dire questions, Ms. Cook testified she was
employed by St. Alphonsus even though she was housed in the FACES building, and
the prosecutor’s office or law enforcement did not get to tell her what to do or what
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questions to ask. (Tr., p.258, L.14 – p.259, L.17.) She testified her questions were
“primarily medical, but there is a forensic aspect that we were trained to do.”
(Tr., p.259, Ls.18-22.)

The same examination could be done at different hospital

locations, the same questions would be asked at those locations, and law enforcement
could refer victims to hospital emergency departments as well. (Tr., p.260, L.1 – p.261,
L.3.)
After voir dire, Mr. Hilterbran renewed the objection, asserting “the statements
made to the nurse don’t fall under the exception for diagnosing and treating under
803(4). . . . [T]his is a single visit collection of evidence, and so I don’t think it’s for the
purpose of diagnosing or treating.” (Tr., p.262, Ls.6-24.) The State contended the
nurse’s testimony that the “primary purpose is medical in nature” was enough for the
statements to come under the Rule 803(4) exception. (Tr., p.264, Ls.10-13.)
The district court found that while the alleged victim was referred to FACES by a
Boise Police Department victim witness coordinator, “from the perspective of the nurse,
her primary role is in determining the proper steps for medical diagnosis and treatment.”
(Tr., p.264, L.24 – p.265, L.4.) Although “there’s a certain documentation that takes
place in terms of documenting injuries, documenting statements that are made at the
time that are incorporated in a report that may have some use in a courtroom at some
later date,” the district court was “satisfied that from the perspective of the witness, her
primary purpose is for medical diagnosis or treatment.” (Tr., p.265, Ls.5-11.) Despite
the “forensic aspect,” the district court found the State had demonstrated by the
evidence that the Rule 803(4) hearsay exception applied, and overruled the objection.
(Tr., p.265, Ls.12-17.)
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After the district court instructed the forensic nurse to limit her testimony to what
the alleged victim said about the second incident (see Tr., p.269, Ls.7-14), Ms. Cook
testified about the forensic examination she gave Ms. Scholtz. (Tr., p.273, L.21 – p.275,
L.13.) Ms. Cook testified that Ms. Scholtz spoke with her regarding the second incident,
describing that an individual grabbed her by the throat and applied pressure until she
lost consciousness as a result.

(Tr., p.277, Ls.5-16.)

Ms. Cook further testified

Ms. Scholtz indicated she had lost consciousness, felt some lightheadedness, and
experienced breathing difficulties, difficulty and pain with swallowing, loss of memory,
loss of voice, and throat pain. (Tr., p.277, L.5 – 278, L.6.) The forensic nurse also
testified Ms. Scholtz described having difficulty swallowing and had some loss of voice
on the day of the forensic examination, three days after the second incident.
(Tr., p.278, Ls.11-17.)
The jury found Mr. Hilterbran not guilty of the attempted strangulation count
related to the first incident. (See R., p.116; Tr., p.369, L.23 – p.370, L.3.) The jury
found Mr. Hilterbran guilty of the attempted strangulation and domestic battery counts
related to the second incident. (See R., pp.117-18; Tr., p.370, Ls.4-15.) The district
court imposed, on each count, a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, to
run concurrently. (R., pp.170-74.)
Mr. Hilterbran filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction and Commitment. (R., pp.175-78.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted Ms. Scholtz’s statements
made to the forensic nurse, Ms. Cook, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(4)?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Ms. Scholtz’s Statements
Made To The Forensic Nurse, Ms. Cook, Under Idaho Rule Of Evidence 803(4)

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hilterbran asserts the district court abused its discretion when it admitted

Ms. Scholtz’s statements made to the forensic nurse, Ms. Cook, under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 803(4).

Contrary to the district court’s determination, the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the statements indicated they were not made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment.

Thus, the statements should not have

been admitted.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
A trial court has “broad discretion” in deciding whether to admit hearsay evidence

under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, and an appellate court “will not overturn
an exercise of that discretion absent a clear showing of abuse.” State v. Stanfield, 158
Idaho 327, 331 (2015). When applying the abuse of discretion standard of review, an
appellate court inquiries into: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
“Hearsay” is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
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I.R.E. 801(c). Here, the district court determined the statements Ms. Scholtz made to
Ms. Cook were hearsay. (See Tr., p.218, Ls.1-4.)
Generally, hearsay is not admissible. I.R.E. 802. However, “[s]tatements made
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past
or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment,” are not excluded by the hearsay rule.
I.R.E. 803(4).

C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards,
Because The Totality Of The Circumstances Indicated The Statements Were Not
Made For Purposes Of Medical Diagnosis Or Treatment
Mr. Hilterbran asserts the district court abused its discretion because it did not

act consistently with the applicable legal standards.

The district court found the

Rule 803(4) hearsay exception applied to Ms. Scholtz’s statements made to Ms. Cook.
(See Tr., p.264, L.24 – p.265, L.17.)

However, the totality of the circumstances

surrounding Ms. Scholtz’s statements actually indicated the statements were not made
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has discussed how to decide whether hearsay
statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment in the context of
statements made by a child alleged victim of sexual abuse to physicians during the
course of medical examinations. State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 517-19 (Ct. App. 1996).
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Kay discussed the generally acknowledged rationale
behind the Rule 803(4) hearsay exception, that “the declarant’s motive to disclose the
truth because his treatment will depend in part on what he says, guarantees the
trustworthiness of the statements.” Kay, 129 Idaho at 518 (internal quotation marks
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omitted). The Kay Court explained, “[t]he foundation that must be established by the
proponent of evidence offered under I.R.E. 803(4) is specified within the language of the
rule. The proponent must show: (1) that the statements were ‘made for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment’; (2) that the statements described ‘medical history, or
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof,’ and (3) that the
statements were ‘reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.’” Id.
The Kay Court held “the trial court should consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the hearsay statement to determine whether a young child’s
statement was ‘made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.’” Id. The Court
held the trial court “may consider any factors which bear upon the likelihood that the
child made the statement for this purpose, including evidence indicating whether the
child understood the need to speak truthfully to the physician and factors that otherwise
indicate the reliability of the statements.” Id. (outlining a non-exclusive list of factors).
It does not appear Idaho’s appellate courts have expressly adopted the above
analysis when deciding whether hearsay statements made by an adult alleged victim of
domestic violence to a FACES forensic nurse were made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment. However, the district court concluded it was supposed to “make
a determination based on the totality of the circumstances to whether the interview was
geared toward gathering evidence rather than providing medical treatment.” (Tr., p.219,
L.22 – p.220, L.2.) The district court based that conclusion on its review of the cases
cited in the State’s written response. (See Tr., p.219, Ls.16-22.) One of the cases cited
by the State was State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139 (2007) (R., p.95), a Confrontation
Clause case where the Idaho Supreme Court used a totality of the circumstances
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analysis to determine whether statements were testimonial—i.e., whether the primary
purpose of the interrogation where the statements were given was to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. See Hooper, 145 Idaho at
144-46. Further, with respect to Rule 803(4), the Idaho Court of Appeals in Kay opined
it was “inappropriate to impose a differing foundational rule” based on the declarant’s
age. See Kay, 129 Idaho at 518. Thus, Mr. Hilterbran submits a court should consider
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the hearsay statements to determine
whether an adult alleged victim’s statements to a FACES forensic nurse were made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Ms. Scholtz’s
statements made to Ms. Cook, the statements were not made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment. Rather, the statements were made for purposes of collecting
evidence for later criminal prosecution. Ms. Scholtz had already been to the ER before
her forensic examination at FACES. (Tr., p.189, Ls.19-23.) Ms. Scholtz testified “the
police made me go to the hospital.” (Tr., p.165, Ls.2-4.) FACES was partnered with
law enforcement agencies and prosecutor’s offices, including the Boise Police
Department and the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office.

(Tr., p.248, L.23 –

p.249, L.24.) Indeed, Ms. Scholtz was referred to FACES by a Boise Police Department
victim witness coordinator (Tr., p.254, Ls.11-16), indicating the purpose of the forensic
examination was for future prosecution. Cf. Kay, 129 Idaho at 518 (discussing, in the
context of a child alleged victim’s statements to a physician during a medical
examination, how the factor of “whether the examination was initiated by an attorney . . .
would suggest that its purpose was for litigation rather than treatment”).
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Further, Ms. Scholtz did not pay for the visit, because it was paid for through a
Department of Justice grant. (See Tr., p.254, L.24 – p.255, L.8.) Additionally, although
Ms. Cook referred Ms. Scholtz to a physician, that referral was to a FACES physician,
who Ms. Scholtz saw the very same day. (Tr., p.256, Ls.5-9.)
Although Ms. Cook testified that her primary purpose was medical in nature (e.g.,
Tr., p.241, Ls.13-20), and the examination could be done at other locations with the
same questions being asked (see Tr., p.260, Ls.1-23), those factors cannot alone
establish that Ms. Scholtz’s statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment. Ms. Cook acknowledged that her questions had a forensic aspect. (See
Tr., p.259, Ls.18-22.) She had been trained to collect evidence and document injuries.
(See Tr., p.236, Ls.2-4.)

Further, even if the forensic nurse believed her primary

purpose was medical in nature, Ms. Scholtz had already been to the ER, apparently for
medical treatment. (See Tr., p.165, Ls.2-4, p.189, Ls.19-23.) Further, Ms. Scholtz had
been referred to FACES not by an ER doctor, but by a police victim witness coordinator.
(See Tr., p.254, Ls.11-16.) Thus, the factors present in this case suggest Ms. Scholtz’s
statements to Ms. Cook were made for purposes of collecting evidence for later criminal
prosecution, and not made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Ms. Scholtz’s
statements made to Ms. Cook, the statements were not made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment. See Kay, 129 Idaho at 518. Thus, the State did not establish
the foundation required to admit the evidence under the Rule 803(4) hearsay exception.
See id. The statements should not have been admitted. The district court therefore
abused its discretion when it admitted the statements under Rule 803(4), because the
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district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. Mr. Hilterbran’s
judgment of conviction should be vacated, and the matter should be remanded to the
district court for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Hilterbran respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the judgment of conviction and remand this matter to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 8th day of March, 2017.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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